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Abstract
Many new web-based services are introduced as free services. Depending
on the seller’s business model, some remain free in the long run, while others
switch to pay mode at some point in time. I characterize the relation between
buyers and a new service seller when the former are uncertain about the latter’s
business model. I derive a natural signalling equilibrium where the seller plays
a “lock-in-and-switch” strategy, while buyers play a “wait-and-see” strategy. I
show the equilibrium entails diffusion even though consumers are identical and
equally aware of the new service’s existence.
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1 Introduction
The economic and social impact of the Internet can hardly be overstated. One of
the many effects of the “information highway” is the wealth of new services that
it allows for—sometimes web-based versions of existing services, sometimes entirely
new services. Examples include web-based email, news, blogging, on-line radio and
TV; and various types of organized information (dictionaries and encyclopedias,
directions, restaurant reviews, financial information, and so forth).
Frequently, new services are offered for free. Examples include JumpTV, Vin-
digo, AvantGo or Google mail. However, a zero introductory price is not necessarily
a permanent feature: at some point, Vindigo and JumpTV started charging for their
services; AvantGo and Google mail are still free.1
The variety of pricing strategies reflects the variety of business models followed
by new service suppliers. Sometimes revenues are primarily based on consumer sub-
scription fees, in which case a zero introductory price is most likely a temporary
offer. In other cases, revenues are primarily based on advertising or referral fees
charged to third parties, in which case consumers can expect zero prices to be a per-
manent feature. In most cases, however, revenues are a combination of advertising
and subscription revenue. In fact, it is common for sellers to offer two options, a free
option and a pay option, with different levels of service and advertising included.
From a consumer’s point of view, whether to start using one of these services
is a difficult decision problem. A starting cost must normally be incurred: getting
acquainted with how the service works, downloading software, perhaps making some
complementary investment. Against this cost — typically a one-time sunk cost —
potential adopters must weigh an uncertain benefit: perhaps the service will be
offered for free indefinitely, perhaps the seller will start charging for it at some point
in time.
In this paper, I characterize the strategic interaction between seller and buyers in
a situation of asymmetric information. Consumers are uncertain about the seller’s
business model, a feature that I model by assuming the seller can be of two types: H
and L. A type H seller, under complete information, would optimally set a strictly
positive price — the seller’s business model is to charge consumers. A type L seller,
in turn, has marginal cost sufficiently negative that its optimal price is zero. The
idea of a negative marginal cost captures the business model whereby sellers earn
revenue from a third party either in the form of advertising or business referrals.
I consider a “natural” Bayesian equilibium and show that it involves gradual
separation between the two seller types. For a period of time, sellers pool at a price
1AvantGo offers a premium service for a fee. In Section 4, I consider the case when a seller’s set
of options extends beyond the choice of free and pay modes.
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of zero. Eventually, a high-cost seller type switches to its monopoly price. Until
then, potential adopters gradually enter, by paying the necessary sunk cost and thus
becoming “locked-in” to the seller.
In other words, the seller — in particular the high-cost seller — plays a “lock-in-
and-switch” type of strategy: set prices at zero, wait while buyers gradually come
in, then switch to pay mode. Buyers, in turn, play a “wait-and-see” strategy: wait
while price is at zero and gradually update the belief that the seller’s business model
is one of charging third parties, not the buyers.
Previous economic research has dealt with new product introduction under asym-
metric information. This literature typically derives separation equilibria, whereby
the introductory price indicates to consumers the firm’s level of cost or quality. If
the length of commitment to price is very short, however, than no pure separation
equilibrium exists. I focus in the case of no commitment to prices by considering
the extreme case of continuous time; and show that a “gradual separation” equilib-
rium exists, whereby sellers pool at zero price for a while and the high cost seller
eventually switches to a positive price.
One of the interesting characteristics of the equilibrium I consider is diffusion.
Specifically, even though all consumers are identical and equally aware of the ex-
istence of the new service, different consumers adopt the new service at different
moments in time. In this sense, I provide an explanation for diffusion that differs
from the traditional models based on word-of-mouth effects or consumer heterogene-
ity.
2 Model
The central players in my model are a seller and a continuum of consumers. I am
interested in examining the case when the seller has no ability to commit to future
prices. In order to do so, I consider the extreme case of continuous time and assume
the seller must set p(t) for all t ∈ [0,∞). I also assume that both seller and buyers
discount the future according to an interest rate r.
All consumers have the same utility function. In order to start using the new
service, a consumer must pay a sunk cost s/r, so that s represents the equivalent
flow of cost the new consumer must commit to. Upon adoption, a consumer receives
a surplus rate of µ(p) at each moment in time, where p is price at that moment in
time. (I could consider a more complicated model including the decision of how
much to consume of the service, but all that I need is the value of consumer surplus
as a function of price.)
A central feature of the model is incomplete information: consumers are uncer-
tain about the seller’s business model. I model this feature by assuming that the
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seller can be of two types: H and L. A type H seller as zero marginal cost. Given a
set of consumers and complete information, an H seller would optimally set a strictly
positive price — the seller’s business model is to charge consumers. A type L seller,
in turn, has marginal cost sufficiently negative that its optimal price is zero. The
idea of a negative marginal cost captures the business model whereby sellers earn
revenue from a third party either in the form of advertising or business referrals.
Note that an optimal price of zero is not a knife-edge situation as long as negative
prices are not feasible. The assumption is then that the seller’s cost is sufficiently
negative that the optimal price (under complete information) would be negative.
The seller’s type is the seller’s private information; consumers only know the
distribution of types, holding a prior ρ that the seller is of type L. Let pi? be a type
H seller’s profit per consumer if it sets its (static, complete information) optimal
price. (Notice that, since all consumers are identical, optimal price is independent
of the number of consumers.) Let µ◦ be consumer surplus under zero price, and µ?
consumer surplus when price equals seller H’s optimal price. I make a fundamental
assumption regarding consumers’ adoption cost in relation to consumer surplus:
Assumption 1 µ? < s < µ◦.
In other words, under complete information consumers would not buy from a high-
cost seller, but they would from a low-cost seller. If this assumption is violated, then
the problem is trivial. Specifically, if s is lower than µ? then the only equilibrium is
for all potential adopters to adopt at time zero. If, on the other hand, s is greater
than µ◦, then the only equilibrium is for consumers never to adopt.
3 Diffusion equilibrium
The main result in the paper is that there exists a diffusion equilibrium to the game
presented in the previous section. The nature of this equilibrium is that a type H
seller will set zero price for some time and then switch to its optimal static monopoly
price. Consumers, in turn, gradually pay the “entry” cost required to consume the
product. In other words, the seller plays a “lock-in and switch” strategy, whereas
consumers play a “wait-and-see” strategy.
Proposition 1 There exists a Bayesian equilibrium characterized by the following
behavioral strategies. Let
T = −(s− µ
?) ln ρ
(µ◦ − s) r .
An L seller always sets zero price. An H seller starts pricing at zero; for t < T and
conditional on having set zero price in the past, an H seller switches to monopoly
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price at time t with probability density
θ(t) =
− ln ρ
T
exp
(
ln ρ
T
t
)
1− ρ+ exp
(
ln ρ
T
t
) ;
finally, for t > T an H seller sets monopoly price.
For t < T and conditional on having observed zero price in the past, a potential
adopter enters with probability density
λ(t) =
r exp(r T + r t)
1− exp(r T + r t) ,
where ρ is the initial belief the seller is of type L. For t > T , a potential adopter
enters if and only if price is zero.
In order to better understand the nature of the equilibrium, Figure 1 depicts the
cumulative distribution functions of the seller and buyers’ strategies. Specifically,
F (t) is the probability that an H type seller will have switched to pay mode by time
t, whereas Q(t) is the fraction of consumers who adopt by time t conditional on the
service being offered for free up until then. In the proof of Proposition 1, which I
include in the Appendix, I show that
F (t) =
1
1− ρ
1− exp( ln ρ
T
t
) ,
so that the hazard rate θ(t),
θ(t) ≡ f(t)
1− F (t) ,
where f(t) is the density corresponding to F (t), is given by the expression in the
proposition. Regarding the rate of adoption, I show that
Q(t) = exp
(
r(t− T )
)
, (1)
so that the hazard rate λ(t),
λ(t) ≡ q(t)
1−Q(t) ,
where q(t) is the density corresponding to Q(t), is given by the expression in the
proposition.
The equilibrium in Proposition 1 involves mixed strategies. I derive the equilib-
rium in the usual way: the seller’s indifference condition implies an adoption path
for buyers, and the buyers’ indifference condition implies a price switch distribution.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium cumulative distribution functions.
Specifically, in order for an H seller to be indifferent between switching to pay mode
and continuing with zero price there must be a “promise” that by continuing with
zero price the installed base will increase. Since the opportunity cost of keeping
price at zero is greater the greater the installed base, the increase in installed base
itself must be greater the greater the installed base. This implies an exponential
growth path for Q:
Q(t) = Q(0) er t.
In order for consumers to be indifferent between adopting now or at a future moment
in time, F must be given by
F (t) =
1
1− ρ
1− exp(µ◦ − s
s− µ? r t
) .
Imposing F (T ) = 1, we get the value of T . Finally, this allows us to pin down the
value of Q(0).
The intuition for the expression of F is not immediately apparent. Note however
that the hazard rate θ(t) ≡ f(t)/(1−F (t)) increases exponentially. This is intuitive
as the value of θ(t) corresponds to the consumer’s option value of waiting: by waiting
for a period d t, there is a chance θ(t) that the seller will switch to pay mode, in which
case the consumer will have optimally saved the sunk cost s/r. Now, the longer the
service is offered for free the more convinced the consumer is that the seller’s business
model is one of zero price. In order to balance this increase value from adoption we
must also increase the value of waiting — which we do by increasing θ.
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It can be shown that F is concave and Q is convex (for 0 < t < T ), so the quali-
tative properties of Figure 1 are general. Regarding the value of T , the comparative
dynamics produce the expected results: T tends to zero as ρ tends to 1, and to
infinity as ρ tends to zero. Moreover, T is increasing in s and decreasing in µ◦, µ?
and r.
4 Extensions and related work
There is a very extensive economics literature on the adoption of new goods. There
is also a very extensive literature on the implications of asymmetric information be-
tween seller and buyers. In this section, I try to relate my model to these literatures.
I also consider alternative interpretations and extensions of my basic model.
Relation to the diffusion literature. One interesting feature of my equi-
librium is that it induces diffusion, that is, not all adopters start purchasing at the
same time. At the risk of oversimplifying, the previous literature on new product
diffusion can be summarized into two classes of theories. One is based on imperfect
knowledge of product availability and some form of word-of-mouth communication
whereby later adopters learn from earlier ones. The second one is based on adopter
heterogeneity and a declining trend in adoption price: high valuation adopters buy
earlier, low valuation adopters buy later.2 In my model, diffusion results from the
consumers’ wait-and-see strategy, not from adopter heterogeneity. Naturally, my
assumption of consumer homogeneity is not particularly realistic. Moreover, in a
richer model that featured heterogeneous consumers I would expect the order of
adoption to be monotonic in consumer type. However, even in that case an impor-
tant portion of diffusion would be due to consumer uncertainty about the seller’s
business model.
An additional difference with respect to the diffusion story based on adopter
heterogeneity is that the latter requires that price be declining over time. In my
gradual separation equilibrium, however, expected price is increasing over time.
Relation to the viscous demand and switching costs literature. Radner
(2003) and Radner and Richardson (2003) propose models of “viscous demand,”
the situation when demand adjusts slowly to changes in prices. Radner (2003)
proposes an “attention budget” explanation for demand viscosity. As he puts it,
“the (potential) consumer cannot be thinking every hour, or even every week, about
2See Bass (1969) and Jensen (1982) for examples of the former approach; and Griliches (1957),
David (1969), Davies (1979) for examples of the latter approach. See also Geroski (2000) for a good
survey of this literature.
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which long-distance carrier to use. Rather, the consumer rethinks such decisions
from time to time, regularly or at some random intervals.” If different consumers
do their rethinking at different moments of time, then the phenomenon of gradual
response to price changes results naturally.
Suppose there is an incumbent firm (e.g., AT&T) charging price p. Suppose
that an entrant (e.g., MCI) moves in with a lower price, p′ < p. If consumers are
uncertain about the entrant’s cost, then we have a situation similar to the adoption
of a new service. Specifically, I may reinterpret the adoption of a new seller as a
switch from an existing seller. My model then provides an alternative foundation
for demand viscosity. Even if consumers have an infinite “attention budget,” to use
Radner’s terminology, they do not switch immediately; rather, they play a “wait-
and-see” strategy, as shown in Section 3, which in turn leads to gradual adjustment
to a lower price set by an entrant — a viscous demand shift.
Continuing with the analogy between new product adoption and seller switching,
my model is related to the switching cost literature (see, for example, Klemperer,
1995). However, this literature typically does not consider the information asym-
metry that is essential in my model.
Finally, a related series of papers have looked at price dynamics with customer
loyalties that create demand inertia.3 These papers, like Radner (2003) and Radner
and Richardson (2003), take a reduced-form approach to consumer behavior. By
contrast, I explicitly model the optimal Bayesian behavior of potential consumers.
Relation to the “bait-and-switch” literature. Sellers sometimes practice
a form of false advertising known as “bait and switch.” They advertise a certain
good at a certain price, thus enticing consumers to visit their store. But when the
consumer visits the seller, that is, when the consumer has paid a sunk search cost,
then the seller tries to sell a different product at a different price. Various authors
have shown how bait and switch can be an equilibrium strategy. However, they have
not considered to role of time as I do in this paper.4
The equilibrium of my model shares some of the features of equilibrium bait and
switch. Rational buyers know that, with some probability, they will regret having
paid the sunk cost required before a purchase. This cost can be a search cost (bait
and switch) or one of the investments listed in the Introduction (lock-in and switch).
The reason for the regret is asymmetric information regarding the sellers inventory
(bait and switch) or some aspect of the seller’s business model (lock-in and switch).
3See Rosenthal (1982), Rosenthal (1986), Chen and Rosenthal (1996).
4See Gerstner and Hess (1990), Lazear (1995), Wilkie et al (1998). These papers are inconclusive
as to the welfare effects of bait-and-switch, a (currently) illegal activity.
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Relation to the price signalling literature. In a classic paper, Bagwell
(1987) showed that, in a two period model of asymmetric information about seller
cost, there may exist an equilibrium where first period price signals the firm’s cost
and therefore expected second period price.5 In Bagwell’s model, consumers must
pay a search cost before visiting a particular seller. In this sense, Bagwell’s model
addresses the issues considered in this paper: (a) buyers must pay a cost before
beginning to enjoy the new service; and (b) buyers are uncertain about future price.
However, there are reasons to believe Bagwell’s equilibrium may not exist in
many real-world situations. In fact, if the first period is very short and negative
prices are unfeasible, then no separating equilibrium exists. Intuitively, a high cost
seller would always want to mimic a low cost seller, thus attracting more consumers
and then exploiting its enlarged base of captive consumers. If a money burning
technology such as advertising is available, then a combination of price and money
burning may achieve separation. But imperfect observability or other reasons may
limit such a possibility.
In this paper, by considering a model of continuous time I implicitly make the
extreme assumption that the seller cannot commit to prices. This implies that price
signalling as in Bagwell’s model is not feasible. Prices can still signal seller cost but
only when such prices are maintained for a period of time. Continuous time also
implies that there exist no equilibria with pure separation. Instead, I consider the
possibility of semi-separating equilibria whereby types initially pool and gradually
separate (according to the cdf F ). Specifically, in my model separation is given by
the time spent at zero price, rather than by the price level itself.
There also exists a literature on separation in dynamic models. The classical
application of signalling and separation is Spence’s job market signalling game,
a two-stage game where workers first choose their education level and firms then
make job offers. The Riley (1979) outcome of this game is a separating equilibrium
whereby a low ability worker makes no investment and a high ability worker makes
the lowest investment such that the low ability type has no incentive to mimic.
Noldeke and Van Damme (1990) show that this separation equilibrium survives
even if firms can make offers before workers finish their investment in education
(and workers cannot commit not to accept interim offers). Swinkels (1999) however
shows that, if job offers are not publicly observed, then the equilibrium involves
either pooling or partial pooling. My result bears some relation to Swinkels (1999)
in that it involves a semi-pooling, or semi-separating, equilibrium.
More recently, Janssen and Roy (2002), consider a dynamic model of a durable
good with adverse selection. They show that the classical static-game lemons prob-
lem disappears when time is taken into account. In equilibrium, both price and
5See also Bagwell and Riordan (1991), Judd and Riordan (1993).
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the quality of the goods traded increase over time. Although my model is one of
signalling, not screening, the equilibrium I consider shares some of the features of
that in Janssen and Roy (2002), namely the role of time in achieving separation.
Relation to the learning curve and network effects literatures. The
equilibrium presented in Proposition 1 involves introductory pricing. Two of the
most popular explanations for this pricing strategy are learning by doing and net-
work externalities. In a two-period model, Spence (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole
(1983) have shown that learning curve effects imply that first period price may be
lower than cost — and in fact lower than second period price.6 This is very dif-
ferent from my model. In fact, I get introductory pricing even though there is no
“physical” link between periods as in the case of a learning curve.
Regarding network effects, Cabral et al (1999) show that it is remarkably difficult
to obtain introductory prices in a setting where consumers are aware of the seller’s
cost and product quality levels. Their central result features increasing prices but
a small number of strategic buyers, a situation that is unlikely to be found in the
context of web-based services like the ones presented in the Introduction.
5 Concluding remarks
The examples considered in the introduction, and other examples of new Internet
services, suggest that the free-vs-pay model may be a bit simplistic. First, even
if consumers know that a seller will charge for its service, the consumer may not
know the exact price that the seller will charge. In terms of my model, this would
amount to considering more than two types, that is, different values of marginal
cost that would lead to different optimal prices. Alternatively, the consumer may
be uncertain about the demand elasticity, so that, even if cost is known, optimal
price in not known.
I conjecture that none of these extensions would change the qualitative nature
of my results. Specifically, let µ?i be the consumers’ rate of consumer surplus given
that the seller is of type i and sets monopoly price. If there exist seller types i, j
such that µ?i < s < µ
?
j , then I conjecture that the same qualitative features as in
Proposition 1 still hold, that is, different seller types pool for a period of time and
eventually separate.7
6See also Cabral and Riordan (1994).
7The case when more than one type would set a strictly positive price under complete information
is a little more complicated. Suppose that both types H and L have a positive optimal price. I
conjecture that the equilibrium strategy for the H type is similar to that in Proposition 1; whereas
the L type switches to pay mode with probability 1 at time T .
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In addition to multiple types of seller, I could also consider multiple types of
buyer. However, one advantage of my assumption of homogeneous adopters is that
it highlights the fact diffusion is due to the properties of the equilibrium, not the
heterogeneity of adopters.
I could also consider the possibility of the seller offering multiple versions of the
service. For example, Eudora 7.0 is offered in three possible versions:8
• Paid mode. Includes extra software, person-to-person technical support, and
no advertising.
• Sponsored mode. No extra software or person-to-person technical support.
Moreover, there is an ad window and up to 3 sponsored toolbar links.
• Light mode. No ad window but fewer basic features than sponsored mode.
So long as the appropriate generalization of Assumption 1 holds, I conjecture that
the qualitative nature of the result still holds. In other words, the important feature
is that the consumer the consumer would prefer not to incur the entry cost if it
knew that the seller was of the high type.
Finally, a fundamental assumption on which my analysis is founded is that firms
cannot commit to future prices. In fact, the main difference between my results
and Bagwell (1987), who also looks at new product introduction with asymmetric
information, is precisely the seller’s inability to commit to future prices.
Some Internet services suggest that there may be some degree of commitment on
the seller’s part. Take for example the following quote from wordpress.com, which
offers free blogging software and hosting.
Obviously running a high quality service like WordPress.com costs money
somewhere, so when does the ride end and all you freeloaders have to
fork up?
Just kidding! We’re being very careful not to introduce features right
now that we’re not willing to commit to providing for free forever. We
know the software and the service better than anyone else in the world,
so we know what’s what.
What is free now will remain free for as long as we’re around.
There are some pretty cool things we want to add but which have a
higher cost to provide, and once we figure out the details we may make
some paid add-ons available, but they’ll be optional.9
8http://www.eudora.com/download/, visited on April 16, 2007.
9http://faq.wordpress.com/2005/09/28/whats-free/, visited on April 16, 2007.
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While promises are just cheap talk, dynamic reputational concerns may lend
some credibility to announcements of this type. If commitment to future prices is
feasible, then the natural equilibrium would involve immediate separation (as in
Bagwell, 1987). The idea is that the cost of promising zero prices in the future is
lower (maybe even zero) for the low cost firm, but high for the high cost firm.10
However, even if sellers can commit to keep their current offering free, such
offer may be worth little if there is a significant rate of service improvement. By
keeping those improvements inaccessible to the free version, the perceived or the real
value of the free version is degraded, to the point that the seller may be effectively
discontinuing the free option. So, ultimately I believe my assumption of inability
to commit to future price or quality terms is realistic, and so are the qualitative
features of the equilibrium I derive.
10Interestingly, one site suggested MoveableType as one of the best options in terms of free web
development software. When I checked it, I noticed that MoveableType is no longer free, though
it charges a reduced fee for individuals and non-profit institutions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: In the equilibrium I will consider, an L type seller always
sets zero price. For the remainder of the proof, I will focus on the H type seller and
refer to it simply as seller.
In what follows, I derive a mixed-strategy equilibrium. The seller switches to
pay mode by time t with probability F (t). Each consumer, in turn, adopts the new
service by time t with probability Q(t). Since this is a continuum of consumers,
Q(t) is also the measure of consumers who adopt by time t.
By switching at time t, the seller expects a payoff of
e−r tQ(t)pi?.
During the period when the seller is indifferent, this must be constant in t. It follows
that
Q(t) = Q(0) er t. (2)
Solving Q(T ) = 1, where Q(t) is given by (2), we get
Q(0) = e−r T ,
and so
Q(t) = exp
(
r(t− T )
)
. (3)
A consumer who plans to adopt at time t expects a discounted payoff of
ρ e−r t
1
r
(µ◦ − s)+
+ (1− ρ)
∫ ∞
t
e−r x
((
F (x)− F (t)
)
(µ? − s) +
(
1− F (x)
)
(µ◦ − s)
)
dx.
The first term represents the case when the seller is of type L, in which case the
consumer will enjoy zero price at all times after adoption. The second term corre-
sponds to the case of an H type seller. With probability F (t), the seller will have
switched to pay mode, in which case the consumer strictly prefers not to adopt.
With probability 1− F (t), price is still zero and the consumer adopts. At any time
x subsequent to adoption, with probability
(
F (x)− F (t)
)
/
(
1− F (t)
)
the seller
will have switched to pay mode, in which case the buyer receives a net flow of µ?−s
(a negative flow); whereas, with probability
(
1− F (x)
)
/
(
1− F (t)
)
, the seller is
still selling at zero price, yielding the consumer a positive utility flow of µ◦ − s.
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During the period when consumers are indifferent concerning adoption time, this
expression must be constant in time. Taking the derivative with respect to t and
equating to zero we get
−ρ e−r t (µ◦ − s)− (1− ρ)
(
1− F (t)
)
e−r t (µ◦ − s) +
+ (1− ρ)
∫ ∞
t
e−x t (s− µ?) f(t) dx = 0,
where f(t) is the density function corresponding to F (t). Simplifying, we get
(µ◦ − s)(1− ρ)F (t) + (s− µ?)(1− ρ)1
r
f(t)− (µ◦ − s) = 0.
Solving with respect to F (t), we get
F (t) =
1
1− ρ
1− exp(µ◦ − s
s− µ? r t
) , (4)
Equating F (t) = 1 and solving with respect to t we get
T = −(s− µ
?) ln ρ
(µ◦ − s) r (5)
Substituting in (4) and simplifying, we get
F (t) =
1
1− ρ
1− exp( ln ρ
T
t
) ,
The expressions in the proposition follow. Specifically, θ(t) is given by the derivative
of F (t) with respect to t divided by 1− F (t); and λ(t) is given by the derivative of
Q(t) with respect to t divided by 1−Q(t).
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